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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, APSCME, APL-CIO, WESTCHESTER 
COUNTY LOCAL 860, WESTCHESTER COUNTY 
UNIT 9200, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15859 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
MICHAEL WITTENBERG, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Westchester County Local 860, Westchester County Unit 9200 (CSEA) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its 
charge that the County of Westchester (County) violated §209-a.l(a) 
and (c) of the Public? Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
passed over a unit employee for promotion because of her exercise of 
rights protected by the Act. 
The charge alleges that on February 14, 1994, a unit 
employee, Ralph Arce, was appointed by the County as a 
Board - U-15859 -2 
Supervising Eligibility Examiner instead of Yvonne Nargi-
Martyn;-7 she was ranked thirty on the civil service list for 
that title while Arce was ranked thirty-one.-'' The County's 
answer did not raise timeliness as a defense. Nonetheless, the 
ALJ dismissed this aspect of the charge as untimely, because it 
was filed on August 4, 1994, more than four months after the act 
complained of in the charge.-7 
CSEA excepts only to this determination,-7 arguing that the 
ALJ was precluded from raising timeliness on her own motion 
because the County did not raise timeliness in its answer and the 
untimeliness of this allegation did not become apparent for the 
-
7Nargi-Martyn has been active in CSEA since at least 1985, 
first, as a steward, and, at the times relevant to the charge, as 
a negotiating committee member and as chair of the benefits 
committee, which reviews employees' health insurance benefits 
concerns. 
27Both had received a score of 80. Employees with tie scores 
were ranked by the last four digits of their Social Security 
numbers. 
5/Rules of Procedure (Rules), §204.1(a) (1) . 
^The charge also alleges that the appointments through July 29, 
1994, of unspecified others from the civil service list to the 
Supervising Eligibility Examiner title, instead of Nargi-Martyn 
violated the Act. The appointment of Dora Foy, who was ranked 34 
with a score of 79, on December 1, 1994, was raised by CSEA in a 
March 31, 1994 amendment to the charge. The ALJ found 
insufficient evidence to support the allegation that others were 
improperly appointed to the position instead of Nargi-Martin. 
She also found no evidence of union animus and that the 
appointment of Foy was based on legitimate business concerns. 
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first time at the hearing.-' The County has not filed a 
response to CSEA's exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of 
CSEA's arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision to the extent 
that it finds the allegations relating to the February 14, 1994 
appointment of Arce to be untimely. 
The charge was processed by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation.-7 The County did not 
raise timeliness in its answer as required by §204.3(c)(2) of the 
Rules. Under those two circumstances, the ALJ could dismiss the 
charge as untimely only if the untimeliness of the charge was 
revealed to the ALJ for the first time at the hearing.-7 No 
evidence was presented at the hearing to reveal the untimeliness 
of the charge. The ALJ was not, therefore, permitted under the 
Rules to raise timeliness on her own motion. 
The decision of the ALJ, dismissing as untimely the 
allegations in the charge related to the February 14, 1994 
appointment of Arce, is, therefore, reversed and the matter is 
5/Rules, §204.7(1), provides: 
[T]he administrative law judge may dismiss a charge, on 
the ground that the alleged violation occurred more 
than four months prior to the filing of the charge, but 
only if the failure of timeliness was first revealed 
during the hearing. An objection to timeliness of the 
charge, if not duly raised, shall be deemed waived* 
-''Under §204.2 (a) of the Rules, the Director is to review and 
dismiss a charge if he concludes that the violation alleged 
occurred more than four months before the charge was filed. 
^Rules, §204.7(1). 
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remanded to the A U for a decision on the merits of this 
allegation. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: January 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline-^ R. TCinsella, Chairperson 
Eric J\ Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALLEN GRANT BOYAR, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17075 
BUFFALO TEACHERS' FEDERATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
ALBERT GRANDE, ESQ., for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Allen Grant 
Boyar to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing his charge 
against the Buffalo Teachers' Federation, Inc. (BTF). The 
charge, filed on August 29, 1995, alleges that the BTF breached 
its duty of fair representation in violation of §209-a.2(c) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by failing to 
pursue, or respond to several requests for the status of, a CPLR 
Article 78 proceeding against the Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of Buffalo (District). 
Boyar was notified in the spring of 1992 that he had failed 
a teacher examination given by the District in October 1991. 
Boyar wrote to the District in April 1992 to protest the conduct 
and grading of the interview portion of the examination. The 
Board - U-17075 -2 
District rejected his "protest" in June 1992. Boyar or his 
attorneys regularly contacted the BTF regarding its willingness 
to commence a proceeding against the District starting in June 
1993, and continuing on several dates in 1994 and 1995. The BTF 
did not respond to any of these inquiries. Boyar filed this 
charge after his July 29, 1995 inquiry went unanswered. 
The Director dismissed the charge as untimely. He concluded 
that Boyar had to have known that BTF was not going to initiate 
any proceeding or respond to any of his inquiries long before the 
charge was filed. 
Boyar argues in his exceptions that his charge could not be 
untimely because there was no date certain from which to identify 
a violation of the Act because the BTF in bad faith refused to 
respond to his inquiries. 
Having considered Boyar's exceptions, we affirm the 
Director's decision. 
The four months within which an improper practice charge may 
be filed begins to run when the charging party knew or should 
have known of the violation alleged in the charge.-7 Although 
there is usually a date certain for a violation of the Act, an 
improper practice can accrue without the conduct complained of 
having a date certain and the four-month filing period will 
commence from the date the charging party can reasonably be 
deemed to have known that an improper practice may have been 
17See, e.g.
 f New York City Transit Auth. , 28 PERB 53070 (1995) . 
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committed. As this case demonstrates, to hold otherwise would 
expose parties to litigation years after the alleged violation 
has been committed. Without having to fix a date certain for 
violation, Boyar had to have known more than four months before 
this charge was filed that BTF was not even going to respond to 
his inquiries, let alone commence a judicial proceeding on his 
behalf.-7 The letter sent by Boyar's attorneys to the BTF on 
December 1, 1993 demands a prompt response to their inquiry and 
states that an improper practice charge will have to be filed if 
a response is not received "within a reasonable time". Not only 
was there no response to this letter, several subsequent 
inquiries also went unanswered. At the latest, Boyar's filing 
period began shortly after that December 1, 199 3 letter was sent. 
The charge is untimely as measured from any date on which Boyar 
could reasonably have expected a response to that letter. When 
no response to that letter came within a reasonable period of 
time, Boyar must be deemed to have known that his requests for 
BTF's assistance were denied. Therefore, the Director properly 
dismissed the charge as untimely filed. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied 
and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
^Unless a different period is prescribed by law, a CPLR 
Article 78 proceeding must be commenced within four months of the 
governmental action sought to be reviewed. In this case, that 
governmental action occurred, at the latest, in June 1992, when 
the District rejected Boyar's protest. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
J«uJ. -1^ %-. [\r\<rtJ J^ 
Pa'uliije-'R. K i n s e l l a , Chai rperson 
E r i c J/. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
OTSELIC VALLEY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, APT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16284 
OTSELIC VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
OTSELIC VALLEY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16285 
OTSELIC VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
PETER D. BLOOD, for Charging Parties 
MARK PETTITT, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Otselic 
Valley Central School District (District) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). On December 21, 1994, the 
Otselic Valley Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (OVTA) 
and the Otselic Valley Employees Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(OVEA) filed identical charges alleging that the District 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
Board - U-16284 & U-16285 
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(Act) when it rescinded its practice of allowing unit employees 
to care for their own or others7 children at their work site 
during scheduled work hours.-7 After a hearing, the ALT held 
that the District violated the Act as alleged except as to one 
particular.-7 In finding the refusal to bargain, the ALJ 
dismissed the District's timeliness and waiver defenses and its 
defense that the practice did not embrace a mandatorily 
negotiable subject. The ALJ also concluded that the practice was 
not inconsistent with any of the terms of the parties' agreements 
to which the District might otherwise have been allowed to 
revert. -7 
The District takes exception to each of the ALJ's 
aforementioned determinations. OVTA and OVEA argue in response 
that the ALJ's decision is correct in all respects and should be 
affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
As to the timeliness of the charges, a polling of the board 
of education members at its meeting on May 18, 1994, which 
•^Except for bus drivers, who were allowed to take their own 
children on their bus runs, the child care ran from approximately 
3:05 p.m. to 3:20 p.m., after the end of the students' class day. 
2/The ALJ dismissed OVEA's allegation that the child-care 
practice included other than the employees' own children. He 
found that OVEA unit employees were only allowed to care for 
their own children, not others' children. OVEA has not taken any 
exception to this determination. 
-
7See, e.cr. , Maine-Endwell Cent. Sch. Dist. , 15 PERB f3 025 
(1982). 
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reflected a consensus opinion that the child-care practice should 
be rescinded effective June 1, 1994, is not an act of impropriety 
from which the four-month filing period would necessarily begin 
to run. Whether formal or informal, the May 18 polling was an 
act taken by the District's legislative body. Actions by a 
government's legislative body cannot constitute a violation of 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act because a legislative body has neither the 
right nor the duty to bargain collectively under the Act.^ 
That duty is lodged with the government's chief executive 
officer. OVTA and OVEA had no cognizable improper practice until 
there was executive action to change the former practice. As 
such, the four-month filing period could not begin to run until 
the date that agents of OVEA and OVTA knew or should have known 
that the District's superintendent of schools, Linda Taylor, or 
her agents, intended to implement the change in practice 
announced by the board of education on May 18. In support of its 
claim that both charges are untimely, the District argues that 
the record shows that Anna de Glee, the high school principal, 
and Taylor told employees in both units about the change in 
practice shortly before and after the board of education's May 18 
meeting. For the reasons stated below, the conversations relied 
upon by the District do not establish the untimeliness of either 
charge. 
^See. e.g.. City of Lockport. 26 PERB 53048 (1993). 
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Even assuming that de Glee's conversations with unit 
employees conveyed an unqualified executive intent to implement 
the board of education's announced change in child-care practice, 
they were ineffective to start the four-month filing period 
running against OVEA. There is no evidence that any of these 
employees held any office or any other agency relation with OVEA. 
Individual unit employees have no duty under the Act to 
communicate information given them by their employer to their 
bargaining agent. To commence the four-month filing period, an 
employer need only take some action to ensure that some 
responsible agent of the union has actual or constructive 
knowledge of a change in prevailing terms and conditions of 
employment. It is the bargaining agent alone, not the employees, 
which has the right and duty to negotiate and it alone may 
challenge the employer's alleged unilateral change in terms and 
conditions of employment. Individual employees may not bring a 
§209-a.l(d) charge. Notice to nonagent employees, accordingly, 
does not start the union charging party's four-month filing 
period except in those unusual circumstances when notice to 
employees would constitute constructive notice to the union. The 
individual meetings which de Glee had with a few employees do not 
constitute constructive notice to OVEA of a unilateral change in 
practice. The manner in which the meetings were held and the 
small number of employees involved would not have put OVEA on 
notice of the District's intent to implement a change in 
practice. 
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In line with the obligation to give notice to the union 
charging party, the District argues that Taylor told 
representatives of both OVEA and OVTA at a staff meeting on 
May 19, the day after the board of education meeting, that 
effective June 1, the child-care practice would end. Taylor was 
at that time serving as the elementary school principal and the 
meeting in question was at the elementary school. 
Taylor's testimony, as the District argues, is unrebutted. 
However, even as unrebutted, it does not establish the 
untimeliness of either charge. The record shows persuasively 
that Taylor's executive implementation of the May 18 board of 
education legislative announcement was tied directly to the board 
of education's action with respect to that announcement. In that 
regard, it is unrebutted that at a special June meeting of the 
board of education, with Taylor in attendance, the president of 
the board of education announced that the May 18 change was 
tabled pending further research. What was communicated to OVEA 
and OVTA representatives before and after that meeting reenforced 
that Taylor and her agents did not consider the May 18 action to 
be final. 
De Glee, the high school principal, held a staff meeting on 
May 17. At that meeting, she told the high school staff, 
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including Patricia Graham,57 OVTA president, about what was then 
an anticipated change in practice. According to Graham's 
unrebutted testimony, de Glee also told the staff that there was 
"still a lot of discussion" about it, that it "really wasn't 
official" and that "she would let us know when we absolutely 
couldn't have our kids there anymore." Even though made before 
the May 18 board of education meeting, de Glee's statements 
conveyed to the staff, including any OVEA or OVTA representatives 
who were present, that final action regarding the child-care 
practice was yet to come and that staff would be notified when it 
came. 
De Glee also had conversations with employees after the 
May 18 board of education meeting which included OVTA president 
Graham. Although her conversations with the OVEA unit employees 
were ineffective to commence the four-month filing period, her 
conversation with Graham might ordinarily be sufficient to start 
the time for OVTA to file a charge concerning a change in child-
care practice. De Glee's statement to Graham in May, however, 
cannot be considered in isolation and apart from subsequent 
events. 
Taylor told Graham in late June, after the board of 
education met in special session that month, that the child-care 
^Although Graham's testimony conveys an impression that this 
staff meeting was after the May 18 board of education meeting, de 
Glee's testimony was specific that high school staff meetings are 
held on the Tuesday preceding a regular board of education 
meeting. 
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issue was still being researched by the board of education. This 
conversation with Taylor in June clearly conveyed to Graham that 
the change in child-care practice had not been finalized. After 
de Glee's conversation with Graham, teachers continued to have 
their children in their classrooms after school. De Glee's 
earlier conversation with Graham, therefore, must be considered 
to have been superseded by Taylor's subsequent conversation with 
Graham to whatever extent the two conversations are inconsistent 
in terms of the finality of the change in child-care practice. 
It was not until September, at the earliest, that Graham would 
have known that Taylor considered the child-care change final. 
Even then, the information was not conveyed to Graham by Taylor 
but by a unit employee whom Taylor had told could no longer watch 
her children after school. 
Taylor did not inform John Roalef, OVEA's president, until 
late August that the board of education had made a "final 
decision" to change the child-care practice in accordance with 
the May 18 announcement. 
In summary, OVEA did not know, nor should it have known, 
that Taylor was going to implement the May 18 board of education 
announcement until late August. OVTA had no knowledge in that 
regard until at least September. As measured from these dates, 
the District has not shown the charge to be untimely as to either 
organization and, as it bears the burden of proof on that 
defense, the ALJ properly reached the merits of the charges. 
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As to the merits, the child-care practice is clearly an 
economic benefit to employees. Although the District itself 
recognizes that the practice has a monetary cost and value, it 
argues that the practice is not a term and condition of 
employment because the arrangement was not formal and was not 
delivered in the context of a day care facility. Neither the 
degree of formalization nor the delivery mechanism, however, has 
any bearing on the negotiability analysis, which centers on the 
nature of the subject matter in issue.-1 The fundamental nature 
of the child-care practice which the District ended is economic, 
clearly embracing aspects of wages and compensation because the 
employees who availed themselves of the prior practice were saved 
the cost of alternative child care. Since that monetary savings 
was made available to them solely by virtue of their employment 
relationship with the District, the District was obligated to 
negotiate with OVTA and OVEA before it made any change in that 
practice, absent some controlling defense. 
Turning to the District's remaining defenses, the District 
argues that ALJ limited its waiver defense to one premised upon 
OVEA's and OVTA's management rights clause. The District does 
not take exception to the ALJ's disposition of the management 
rights issue. It argues only that the ALJ should also have 
considered a defense grounded upon other contract clauses. The 
District argues that these other contract provisions are 
^State of New York (Dep't of Transp.t, 27 PERB J[3056 (1994) ; 
Johnstown Police Benevolent Ass'n, 25 PERB [^3085 (1992) . 
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inconsistent with its former child-care practice and, therefore, 
it had the right to revert to the extent of its contract rights 
and obligations. 
The District's exception in this latter regard is, however, 
misplaced. The ALJ devoted a large part of his decision to the 
District's contract reversion defense and he rejected it on the 
merits. He concluded that the child-care practice was not 
inconsistent with the District's rights under the contract to 
assign duties to employees during the scheduled workday. We 
agree. If and to whatever extent a particular employee fails or 
refuses to perform required duties because child care prevented 
the performance of those duties on a given occasion, the District 
may seek to counsel, warn or discipline such employee, subject to 
the employee's countervailing rights, whether contractual or 
otherwise. The possibility that child care may sometimes prove 
distracting to a particular employee in a particular circumstance 
and, thereby, prevent that employee from performing required 
duties in whole or in part is no justification for the unilateral 
abolition of the practice. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions 
are denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Immediately cease implementation of the policy change 
announced by the board of education on May 18, 1994, 
and reinstate the child-care practice for both OVTA and 
OVEA unit employees as it existed prior thereto. 
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2. Make OVTA and OVEA unit employees whole for any 
expenses incurred by them as a result of the 
implementation of the aforementioned policy, with 
interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal 
rate. 
3. Post notice in the form attached in all locations 
normally used to post notices of information to 
employees in the OVTA and OVEA units. 
DATED: January 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees in the unit represented by the Otselic Valley Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(OVTA), that the Otselic Valley Central School District (District) will: 
1. Immediately cease implementation of the policy change announced by the District's board of education on 
May 18, 1994, and reinstate the child-care practice for OVTA unit employees as it existed prior thereto. 
2. Make OVTA unit employees whole for any expenses incurred by them as a result of the implementation of 
the policy referenced in paragraph 1 above, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
OTSELIC VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
'is Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days 
by any other material. 
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees in the unit represented by the Otselic Valley Employees Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(OVEA), that the Otselic Valley Central School District (District) will: 
1. Immediately cease implementation of the policy change announced by the District's board of education on 
May 18,1994, and reinstate the child-care practice for OVEA unit employees as it existed prior thereto. 
2. Make OVEA unit employees whole for any expenses incurred by them as a result of the implementation of 
the policy referenced in paragraph 1 above, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
OTSEUC VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
this Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OF MEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4428 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 833, 
Intervenor. 
RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, P.C. (STUART A. WEINBERGER Of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
JOHN S. BALZANO, COUNTY ATTORNEY, for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. CRAIN of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Local 833 (CSEA) to a decision by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director). Pursuant to 
a petition filed by United Public Service Employees Union 
Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers District 
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Council 424 (Local 424), the Director held mail ballot elections 
in the two units of employees of the County of Oneida (County) 
which the parties stipulated are appropriate. Unit A is a white-
collar unit; Unit B is a blue-collar unit. The Director 
determined that Local 424 had received a majority of the valid 
votes cast in each election. CSEA filed post-election 
objections, which the Director denied in a decision from which 
CSEA now appeals. 
Ballots in both units were mailed on August 7.^ As agreed 
by all parties, employees in Unit A who needed a replacement 
ballot were allowed to telephone PERB from 9:00 a.m. on August 14 
through 8:30 a.m. on August 15. The call-in for Unit B employees 
was from 9:00 a.m. on August 15 through 8:30 a.m. on August 16. 
Ballots in both units were counted on August 28. 
The initial count in Unit A showed that of 1,029 eligible 
employees, 320 voted for CSEA, 370 for Local 424, 22 for neither 
and 33 ballots were challenged. The challenges fell into 
different categories: 13 unsigned ballot envelopes; 6 ineligible 
voters; 4 voters not on eligibility list; 10 duplicate ballots. 
As the 33 challenges combined were sufficient in number to affect 
the results of the election in Unit A, the Director ruled on the 
13 challenges to the unsigned ballot envelopes. The Director 
voided all 13, leaving 732 valid votes cast. Upon that 
determination, Local 424 had received a majority of the valid 
1XA11 dates are in 1995. 
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votes cast in Unit A. The Director did not rule on the remaining 
20 challenges because they were not sufficient in number to 
affect the results of the election once the 13 unsigned ballots 
were voided. 
In Unit B, of 414 eligible employees, 122 voted for CSEA, 
132 for Local 424, 2 for neither and 7 ballots were 
challenged.^ The 132 votes cast for Local 424 established its 
majority status, albeit barely, no matter the disposition of the 
7 challenges. Therefore, the Director did not rule on any of the 
7 challenges in Unit B because they were not sufficient to affect 
the results of the election. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Director's determination that Local 424 has established majority 
status in both units. The first numbered objection is the only 
objection filed to the election in Unit A. All of the remaining 
objections relate to Unit B. By these objections, CSEA seeks to 
increase the actual or potential number of valid ballots. In 
affirming the Director, it is necessary to consider only 
^As in Unit A, the challenges in Unit B fell into different 
categories: 5 unsigned ballot envelopes; 1 ineligible voter; 
1 voter not on eligibility list. 
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objections numbered 1, 3 and 4.-' We do not consider CSEA's 
second-numbered objection or its unnumbered allegation that two 
ballots, which it claims were mailed to us by the employees, may 
have been lost or misplaced by the Director. It is our policy 
and practice to resolve challenges to ballots only to the extent 
those challenges are sufficient in number to affect the results 
of the election. Our dismissal of objections numbered 1, 3 and 4 
makes it unnecessary to consider the second and unnumbered 
objections, both pertaining to the election in Unit B, because 
the number of ballots remaining in issue are not sufficient to 
affect the results of that election. 
OBJECTION NO. 1 fUNIT A^ 
CSEA alleges that the Director should have sent replacement 
ballots to the employees who returned their ballot envelopes 
unsigned before August 18 because there was time for them to vote 
a replacement ballot before the count on August 28. CSEA alleges 
that at least ten of the thirteen voters whose ballots were 
voided in Unit A fall into this category. According to CSEA, the 
Director's failure to send out replacement ballots to these 
-/Objections numbered 1 and 3, as discussed more fully infra, 
allege that replacement ballots -should have been sent to voters 
who did not sign their mailing envelopes. Objection number 2 
alleges that a ballot cast by an employee eligible in Unit B 
should not have been voided. Objection number 4, again discussed 
infra, alleges that several persons who called for a replacement 
ballot never received them. The fifth numbered objection, 
involving Local 424's alleged use of a facsimile ballot in its 
election campaign, was dismissed by the Director and no 
exceptions to that determination have been filed. 
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employees necessitates a second election.^ We, however, affirm 
the Director's determination on this objection for the reasons he 
stated and others. 
CSEA argues in support of this objection that the sending of 
replacement ballots in this case would not have been burdensome 
and is consistent with the National Labor Relations Board's 
(NLRB) election practice and our own policy to offer an election 
promoting as large a voter turnout as possible. 
The election practice which CSEA asks us to adopt and apply 
retroactively is contrary to that which has prevailed since we 
first began holding representation elections in 1967. The 
parties in this case all understood and agreed before ballots 
were mailed that replacement ballots would be sent to employees 
only pursuant to requests they made on the designated call-in 
days. The instruction to employees to sign the return envelope 
is clearly stated in the election notices, which are posted 
throughout an employer's premises, and again in the instructions 
attached to each individual ballot. In addition, employees are 
clearly informed on both the election notices and the 
instructions for voting that a failure to follow those 
instructions may invalidate the ballot. By making the voting 
rules clear, we have taken appropriate steps to encourage voter 
^Even if we were to agree with CSEA in this respect, the 
election in Unit A would not properly be set aside by us. 
Rather, the case would have to be remanded to the Director for a 
determination regarding the other challenges. 
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participation. As CSEA itself points out, 99% of the voters in 
this case followed the election instructions. It has never been 
our role to guarantee elections against any and all errors made 
by the voters themselves. In asking us to serve as a "safety 
net" for the other 1%, CSEA asks us to assume a burden which is 
unreasonable for several reasons. 
First, any election practice we would adopt in this regard 
could not be limited to this case alone. A practice under which 
the Director would undertake to send replacement ballots without 
request to those mailing unsigned return envelopes would have to 
apply to all of our elections. The large size of many public 
sector units would make it extremely difficult to conduct the 
type of screening of ballots which would be necessary if we were 
to require the Director to send replacement ballots to employees 
without their request. All of the ballots cast in an election 
would have to be screened as received to ensure that any unsigned 
envelopes were detected and that replacement materials were sent 
sufficiently in advance of the count date to allow the voter to 
both receive the replacement ballot and return it. In this case, 
over 700 ballots were returned and all of those ballots would 
have to be screened to determine who, under CSEA's argument, 
would be sent a replacement ballot. 
Second, adoption of a practice of sending out unsolicited 
replacement ballots would likely cause election objections, 
thereby delaying the resolution of the majority status question 
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raised by a decertification petition. Elections would be opened 
to objections, for example, if unsigned envelopes were 
inadvertently overlooked by the Director during inspection or if 
the Director were to fix a cutoff date for issuing a replacement 
ballot which a party could argue was in any way objectionable. 
There is also in the practice we are urged to adopt by CSEA clear 
potential for a return of duplicate ballots, itself a ground for 
challenge to both ballots, and voter confusion stemming from an 
employee's unsolicited receipt of a replacement ballot which may 
not have been needed. Furthermore, other grounds for challenge 
to a ballot might similarly require a screening of ballots if we 
were to screen for unsigned envelopes. That would require the 
Director to anticipate challenges which might never be made by 
the parties. 
Finally, we are deeply concerned about an after-the-fact 
adoption of such an election practice which so completely changes 
prior election practice. Even if we were inclined to consider 
the announcement of such a practice in this case, it would not be 
appropriate to do so except on a prospective basis. Such a 
change could not in fairness be applied retroactively to serve as 
a ground for setting aside this election. 
We are aware that the NLRB's practice is to send a 
replacement ballot to an employee who has not signed the mailing 
envelope if there is sufficient time remaining before the due 
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date for the return of ballots.^ However, the NLRB precedent 
is not binding upon us and we decline to adopt it by decision. 
OBJECTION NO. 3 (UNIT B) 
This is the same in substance for Unit B as CSEA's first 
objection pertaining to Unit A. Under the first numbered 
objection, we held that the Director properly voided the unsigned 
ballot envelopes cast in Unit A. The Director's dismissal of 
this objection is affirmed for the reasons previously stated. 
CSEA's objection numbered 2 affects only one ballot and its 
unnumbered objection affects only two potential ballots. 
Objection numbered 2 involves a ballot in Unit B cast on pink 
paper instead of the blue paper being used in the election in 
Unit B. The voter in Unit B had called in for a replacement 
ballot on the date set aside for call-ins for Unit A, for which 
pink election materials were being used. Although included in 
Unit B, the employee voted a pink ballot because that was what he 
requested and was issued by the Director. At the count, the 
election agent realized that the secrecy of the employee's ballot 
would be compromised if counted because it was the only pink 
ballot. The ballot was, accordingly, voided by the Director. 
In objection numbered 2, CSEA alleges that it did not 
consent to having the ballot voided and that it should not have 
been voided. However, as any reversal of the Director would 
5/David & Newcomer Elevator Co.. 315 NLRB No. 104, 148 LRRM 1044 
(1994). 
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breach the secrecy of the ballot, we would reach this objection 
only if it could affect the outcome of the election because it is 
our policy to maintain the secrecy of ballots to the maximum 
extent possible.-'' By reaching the outstanding challenges to 
the five unsigned envelopes in Unit B, and having affirmed, 
infra, the denial of the fourth numbered objection, the election 
cannot be affected by the vote referenced in objection numbered 
2. By not reaching that objection, any possibility of our 
violating the secrecy of the one employee's ballot is avoided. 
By voiding the five ballots returned in unsigned envelopes 
in Unit B, the number of valid votes cast is reduced to 258. As 
previously noted, only a total of three ballots is in issue under 
objection numbered 2 and the unnumbered objection. Even if we 
were to accept CSEA's objections in both respects, the number of 
potential valid ballots would become 261. Local 424's 132 votes 
establishes its majority status on that tally. Even if it is 
assumed that all three of these employees did or would have voted 
for CSEA, it would have received 127 votes, not enough to 
overturn Local 424's majority status. 
OBJECTION NO. 4 (UNIT B) 
This objection involves four potential votes. Assuming the 
four employees' nonreceipt of a replacement ballot is 
objectionable, that they would have voted had they received a 
-
7See, e.g., Mohawk Valley Nursing Home, 24 PERB J3010 
(1991)(subsequent history omitted). 
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ballot, and that they would have voted for CSEA, the number of 
potential votes would affect Local 424's majority status. 
Therefore, not having considered objection numbered 2 or the 
unnumbered objection, it becomes necessary to reach this 
objection. 
As determined by the Director, and not appealed by CSEA, at 
most, four eligible employees in Unit B called in for a 
replacement ballot but did not receive one. Three ballots were 
returned by the post office as undeliverable because the voters' 
names were misspelled and/or the addresses were incorrect. The 
fourth employee's envelope, however, was not returned by the post 
office. PERB staff prepared the replacement ballot materials 
from messages left by the employees on a tape recorder triggered 
by the telephone call. The recorded message instructs a caller 
to state and spell his or her name and mailing address. None of 
these callers complied with these instructions. They did not 
spell their names or mailing addresses; one omitted the city in 
which he lived. As a result, three of the names were incorrectly 
transcribed from the message tape. A fourth employee's name was, 
however, correctly recorded. A replacement ballot was sent to 
her, but according to a statement she submitted, she did not 
receive it. Her ballot was the one not returned by the post 
office as undeliverable. 
We need not address the ballot of this fourth employee. 
Even if she were added to the pool of potential voters, Local 
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424's 132 votes would still give it the necessary majority 
status. However, if the three other employees were added to the 
pool of potential voters, Local 424's majority status would be 
affected. Therefore, it is necessary to reach the objection as 
it pertains to the other three employees, all of whom are 
identically situated in relevant respect. 
The replacement ballots sent to the other three employees 
were inaccurate. The inaccuracies, however, stem entirely from 
the callers' failure to follow the clear instructions given them. 
This is conceded by CSEA, but it argues that the Director should 
have cross-checked the accuracy of the recorded messages by 
resort to the eligibility list. However, CSEA's argument assumes 
that the Director in this case knew from listening to the call-in 
tapes that the information given by the employees was incorrect. 
The Director's decision states that he had no reason to question 
the accuracy of the information which had been conveyed by the 
callers or the transcriptions which had been made therefrom. 
Moreover, even if the Director suspected that some of the 
callers' information was unclear or incorrect, resort to the 
eligibility list would not have served to clarify the ambiguity 
or correct the mistake. The inaccurately recorded names, of 
course, did not and would not appear on the voter eligibility 
list. All three of the call-in names as recorded, inaccurately 
as that transcription ultimately proved to be, could have been 
the names of eligible employees in Unit B who simply had been 
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left off of the eligibility list by mistake. Similarly, the 
recorded addresses, whether or not accurate from the call-in, 
cannot serve as a reliable cross-check. A primary reason persons 
telephone for replacement ballots is that the address on the 
eligibility list is either wrong or has been changed since the 
date of preparation of that list. An employee's social security 
number, although requested in the call-in, does not appear on the 
eligibility list. In short, there was no way for the Director to 
have ascertained from the materials in his possession that there 
were errors in transcription and no way for him to have corrected 
those errors even if known or suspected by him. 
For the reasons and to the extent set forth above, CSEA's 
exceptions are denied and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
As Local 424's majority status in Unit A and Unit B has been 
established, we are this date issuing the appropriate 
certification. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: January 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
v 
Pauline/R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
^Schmertz, Member / 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MARIANNE SCHANZENBACH, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17108 
MARLBORO FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
W. JAMES YOUNG, ESQ., for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) filed by Marianne Schanzenbach. Her charge alleges 
that, in violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act), the Marlboro Faculty Association (MFA) 
intends to deduct agency shop fees from her salary in 1995-96 
without having the necessary procedures and without having 
provided her with the necessary notices, disclosures, 
explanations and audits. Attached to the charge are twenty-two 
pages of documents consisting of Schanzenbach's letter to the MFA 
objecting to the deduction of agency shop fees, the agency shop 
fee reduction calculation for MFA's affiliates, documents sent to 
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her by MFA regarding the agency shop fee deduction,-7 and a copy 
of the advance reduction check sent to her by MFA for the 1995-96 
school year. 
The Director notified Schanzenbach's attorney that the 
charge as filed was deficient because it did not specify the 
procedures and notices alleged to be inadequate. Although on 
notice from the deficiency letter that the charge would likely be 
dismissed if the noted deficiency was not corrected, 
Schanzenbach's attorney refused to make any amendment or 
clarification because he believed the charge was adequately 
pleaded, as evidenced by the Director's processing of two of 
Schanzenbach's earlier charges against the Association which were 
similarly framed. The Director then dismissed the charge because 
it did not identify the aspects of MFA's procedures and notices 
which were alleged to be inadequate. The Director held that the 
allegations in the charge were conclusory and failed to satisfy 
the requirements of §204.1(b)(3) of our Rules of Procedure 
(Rules). That section of the Rules requires that a charge 
contain "a clear and concise statement of the facts constituting 
the alleged improper practice . . . ." 
Schanzenbach argues in her exceptions that the charge is 
sufficiently specific and is "nearly identical" to the two 
-
;The packet included the following: a letter from the MFA 
briefly explaining Schanzenbach's rights as an agency shop fee 
payer and asking her to become a member; MFA's refund procedure; 
and financial statements relating to MFA's state-wide and 
national affiliates. 
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earlier charges which the Director processed. Schanzenbach 
argues that the Director incorrectly required her to set forth a 
statement of legal position or argument, a requirement not 
imposed upon charging parties generally and one not previously 
required of her. 
Having considered the exceptions, we affirm the Director's 
decision. 
As the Director correctly concluded, it cannot be determined 
from the charge what parts of the MFA's refund procedures or the 
notices and audits issued pursuant thereto are alleged to violate 
the Act. There is only a general, conclusory allegation that 
MFA's procedures, notices and audits are "inadequate". This 
charge can be analogized to one alleging that an employee has 
been discriminated against because of protected activities. Such 
a charge would not be processed without an identification of both 
the specific acts of discrimination imposed upon the employee and 
the form of the allegedly protected activities. Schanzenbach is 
not any differently situated than any other avowed discriminatee. 
Contrary to Schanzenbach's assertion, the Director did not demand 
an explanation of legal theory or legal argument explaining why 
MFA violated the Act. He required only an identification of 
those aspects of the procedures, notices and audits which 
Schanzenbach was seekinrf to '"lacs in issue. Within the twenty-
two pages of procedures, notices and audits could be many 
separate alleged improper practices. The Director and the 
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respondent were entitled to know from the charge each of the 
improprieties being alleged. 
The Director's dismissal of this charge is fully consistent 
with our several decisions dismissing charges pleaded in a 
conclusory fashion.-7 These decisions hold that the 
requirements of §204.1(b)(3) of the Rules are not satisfied by 
allegations which fail to identify the bases for the violation of 
the Act alleged. Therefore, there is no merit to Schanzenbach's 
assertion that the Director singled out her, or agency fee payers 
generally, for the imposition of a higher pleading burden. Quite 
the contrary, Schanzenbach's arguments, if accepted, would place 
agency fee payers in a privileged class, one exempt from the 
pleading requirements to which all others filing charges are 
held. 
Certain of our decisions do reflect a belief that the 
pleading requirement in §204.1(b)(3) of the Rules should be 
liberally construed,-7 particularly in light of a respondent's 
right under §204.3(b) of the Rules to move for particularization 
of the charge.-7 Our liberal construction of the pleading 
requirements as pertaining to a charge, however, has never 
g/Citv Sch. Dist. of the City of New York (Gerstenfeld), 28 PERB 
53017 (1995); City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York (Assante), 
27 PERB f[3 072 (1994) ; State of New York (Div, of Parole) .- 27 PERB 
f3016 (1994); Centro, Inc., CNY (Ensworth) , 17 PERB 53035, aff 'cr 
17 PERB 54520 (1984) . 
^Wappincrers Cent. Sch. Dist., 28 PERB 53016 (1995) . 
^Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n (Dennis) , 26 PERB 53059 (1993) . 
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reached the point of sacrificing other provisions of the Rules or 
leaving a respondent totally in the dark regarding the violations 
alleged against it. Schanzenbach's interpretation would compel 
such sacrifice and would effect such a result, neither of which 
we find acceptable. 
The Director is required under §204.2 of the Rules to make a 
determination on receipt of the charge as to whether the charge 
is untimely or lacking legal merit. Without the minimal 
specification the Director required of Schanzenbach, it would not 
be possible for him to make the review required by our Rules. 
That initial review becomes meaningless if the Director is forced 
to process charges stated in the same conclusory manner as was 
this charge. Without knowing which aspects of MFA's procedures 
and notices were alleged to be "inadequate", he could not know 
whether and which of those allegations were timely and he could 
not determine whether the alleged "inadequacies" set forth an 
arguable violation of the Act. 
Similarly, respondents would be all but forced to move to 
particularize such charges as a matter of routine practice. The 
particularization rules, however, are intended to be applied in 
exceptional circumstances. We will not issue a decision which 
would make such motions the rule, not the exception. Under 
Schanzenbach7s interpretation of the 'r>lsadinrf reTiirements - the 
burden of clarification of a deficient charge would fall entirely 
upon a respondent. A respondent has its own pleading burdens and 
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it is unreasonable to expect it to shoulder, in addition, the 
charging party's. 
Even were a respondent not to move for particularization of 
the charge, its only alternative, not knowing the allegations 
against it, would be to file an answer generally denying any 
violation of the Act. Section 204.3(c) of the Rules requires 
specificity and detail in an answer, which a general denial does 
not supply. 
An examination of the relative burdens is also relevant to 
our analysis. Requiring Schanzenbach to simply identify the 
aspects of the procedures and notices she wished to contest did 
not impose any hardship upon her. Weighing the slight imposition 
on her against the significant adverse effects which would be 
occasioned by the processing of charges pleaded in conclusory 
fashion further supports our rejection of Schanzenbach's 
interpretation of the pleading rules. 
Left for consideration is whether our decision should be 
different because the Director processed two of Schanzenbach's 
earlier charges. We have reviewed those other charges and 
conclude that those charges, as amended, were at least 
substantially similar to the charge as it was filed in this case. 
Schanzenbach argues that the Director was required to process 
this charge as filed because it is the same in all relevant 
respects as the charges which he processed previously. We do not 
agree with this assertion. 
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Those earlier charges perhaps should not have been processed 
without further amendment for they also pleaded only a general 
inadequacy of agency fee procedures, notices and audits. 
Schanzenbach, however, cannot profit from the Director's 
processing of those earlier charges. 
When the charge was filed, Schanzenbach had a basis to 
believe that the charge was properly pleaded. On receipt of that 
charge, the Director notified Schanzenbach that the charge was 
deficient as pleaded. She was put on notice of the specific 
nature of that deficiency and informed of the likely consequences 
if the deficiency was not corrected. At that point, Schanzenbach 
could no longer reasonably conclude that this charge was pleaded 
in sufficient detail. To process this charge would mean that, 
once having processed a deficient charge, the Director forever 
thereafter would be required to process similar deficient 
charges. That result would, much like Schanzenbach's 
interpretation of the pleading requirements, render meaningless 
the Director's required screening of charges as they are filed. 
Moreover, those earlier charges were not brought to us for review 
on exceptions. We surely are not required to issue a decision we 
believe to be incorrect simply because the Director issued 
rulings in earlier charges which were not appealed to us. In 
refusing the Director's demand for some minimal specification, 
Schanzenbach, on notice of the consequences, risked the 
Director's dismissal of the charge and our affirmance on appeal, 
and she is bound to the results of the choice she made. 
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For the reasons set forth 
and the Director's decision is 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
-8 
above, the exceptions are denied 
affirmed. 
that the charge must be, and it 
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f STATE OF NEW YORK 
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In the Matter of 
SUFFOLK COUNTY CORRECTION OFFICERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14176 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK AND SHERIFF OF 
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MEYER, SUOZZI, ENGLISH & KLEIN, P.C. (BARRY J. PEEK Of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (RICHARD K. ZUCKERMAN Of counsel), 
for Respondent 
AXELROD, CORNACHIO, FAMIGHETTI & DAVIS (WAYNE J. SCHAEFER Of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Suffolk 
County Corrections Officers Association (Association) to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its 
charge. It is alleged that the County of Suffolk and the Sheriff 
of Suffolk County, as the joint employer (County). had violated 
§209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) by unilaterally reassigning the care and custody of 
detainees at the District Court detention facility from the 
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correction officers unit to deputy sheriffs. The deputy sheriffs 
are in a unit represented by the Suffolk County Deputy Sheriffs 
Benevolent Association (DSBA), which intervened in the 
proceeding. 
The A U found that although the work transferred to the 
deputy sheriffs was substantially similar to the work previously 
performed by the correction officers, the Association had failed 
to establish that the correction officers had performed the work 
exclusively. 
The Association excepts to the ALT's decision, arguing that 
the ALJ erred in several regards in finding no exclusivity and 
that she failed to address the County's failure to bargain the 
impact of its transfer of work. The County and the DSBA argue in 
response that the ALJ's decision is correct and should be 
affirmed. 
After reviewing the record and considering the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The ALJ found that, from 1973 to 1993, deputy sheriffs were 
responsible for the transport of the detainees to and from the 
District Court detention facility and, until 1985, had guarded 
the detainees when they were actually in court.^ During the 
8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift, correction officers had 
T " o e r \ n n e i Vi-i 1 4 +-\r •fryv 4-Vio /•"•av*za anrl n i i c f n H u /-i-F +-V>o H a f a i n o o e TilVl 1 1 o 
^In 1985, court officers assigned to the courtroom took custody 
of the detainees when they were actually in the courtroom. 
Deputy sheriffs continued to escort the detainees to and from the 
courtroom and the holding cells. 
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they were in the holding cells at the facility. This included 
handcuffing, fingerprinting, and searching the detainees, as well 
as staffing the booking desk, handling intake, inventorying 
property, doing related paperwork and answering the phone. 
However, deputy sheriffs were sometimes assigned, and frequently 
volunteered, to work in the detention facility during the 
8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift when the correction officers were 
short of staff or were on breaks.^ From 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. 
on Mondays through Fridays and all day Saturday and Sunday, the 
holding cells were staffed by deputy sheriffs.^ The District 
Court DWI facility was staffed on Friday nights and weekends by 
both correction officers and deputy sheriffs. The deputy 
sheriffs were and continue to be solely responsible for the care 
and custody of detainees at Family Court, County Court and 
Supreme Court and, with the correction officers, are responsible 
for detainees and inmates from either the courts or the 
correctional facilities who are hospitalized. 
In January 1993, the District Court facility was moved to a 
new building. At that time, deputy sheriffs were assigned full 
^When short of correction officers in the District Court 
detention facility, overtime was regularly offered to the 
correction officers and deputy sheriffs who were assigned to the 
District Court. Correction officers are not utilized to fill 
deputy sheriff vacancies. 
^Even though their shift ended at 4:00 p.m., often corrections 
officers would stay on duty until court recessed, sometimes as 
late as 6:00 or 7:00 p.m., and would staff the holding facility 
along with the deputy sheriffs who came to work at 4:00 p.m. for 
the night shift at the District Court. 
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responsibility for the detainees at the new District Court 
facility.-7 The eighteen correction officers who had been 
assigned to the District Court were reassigned to the County 
correctional facility in Riverhead. 
To establish a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act, it must 
be established that the work that has been transferred out of the 
unit is substantially the same as the work that was performed by 
unit employees. That is.not in dispute here. However, a 
violation will not be found unless the work that has been 
transferred has been historically and exclusively performed by 
unit employees.-f The Association urges that a discernible 
boundary can be drawn around the care and custody of District 
Court detainees during the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift so as to 
establish the Association's exclusive control over that work. 
Even if we were to agree with such a narrow definition of unit 
work, it is clear from the record, as the ALJ found, that the 
deputy sheriffs have regularly been assigned, or have 
volunteered, to work in the District Court detention facility and 
to perform the same functions as the correction officers during 
the day shift. Without objection from the correction officers 
that some of the work was performed by the deputy sheriffs on a 
voluntary basis and was done primarily when the correction 
officers were not available does not require a contrary 
-''The County's decision was prompted by, among other financial 
factors, the large amount of overtime being paid to correction 
officers because of a shortage of correction officers at the 
correctional facilities. 
^Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth. , 18 PERB [^3083 (1985) . 
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conclusion, as the assignments were not made at the sufferance of 
the Association.-7 Unlike Loner Beach, supra, the deputy 
sheriffs were used at times when correction officers were 
available, albeit from the other County facilities, to perform 
the duties regularly assigned to correction officers at the 
District Court. The County's regular use for over twenty years 
of deputy sheriffs during the day shift at the District Court 
detention facility to perform the same duties as the correction 
officers establishes that the care and custody of District Court 
detainees has never been the exclusive work of correction 
officers. Therefore, the County's unilateral decision to assign 
that work to deputy sheriffs at the new District Court does not 
violate §209-a.l(d) of the Act.z/ 
As to the Association's argument that the ALJ erred in not 
finding that the County violated the Act by refusing to negotiate 
the impact of its decision to reassign the work in issue to the 
deputy sheriffs, the failure to negotiate impact is not pled as a 
violation in the Association's improper practice charge. Neither 
does the charge allege that the Association ever made any demand 
of the County to negotiate impact. As that alleged violation was 
not before the ALJ, it was proper for her to make no findings as 
to the negotiation of the impact of the County's decision. 
£;Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Long Beach, 
26 PERB ?[3065 (1993) ; County of Erie. 17 PERB 513067 (1984) . 
^No exceptions were filed to the ALJ's dismissal of the alleged 
violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Act. 
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Based on the foregoing, the Association's exceptions are 
denied and the decision of the ALT is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
a'uline' R. 'Kinsella, Paulina Chairperson 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Memb 
2G- 1/31/96 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Troy (City) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge finding 
that it had violated §209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it took certain 
unilateral actions with respect to its employees in the unit 
represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Rensselaer County Local 842, City of 
Troy Unit (CSEA). 
-^Case No. U-16055 was consolidated with Case No. U-16470 
for hearing and decision below. No exceptions are before us in 
Case No. U-16470. 
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The ALJ found that the City had violated the Act when it 
unilaterally changed its pay periods from weekly to bi-weekly, 
changed the day on which employees received their paychecks, and 
imposed a one-week lag payroll on unit employees.-7 The City 
also was held to have violated the Act when it unilaterally 
eliminated-7 thirty minutes of break time previously enjoyed by 
unit employees,-7 when it unilaterally denied access to CSEA 
representatives to communicate with unit employees in City Hall, 
and when it refused to provide information requested by CSEA 
regarding the layoff of unit employees. 
The City's exceptions address only two aspects of the remedy 
ordered by the ALJ. It argues that the ALJ's order to reinstate 
the weekly payroll period, rescind the bi-weekly and lag payroll, 
and make the unit employees whole for any pay which was lagged is 
punitive because of the City's financial condition. It further 
argues that the ALJ's order restoring the thirty minutes of break 
time and directing the City to compensate unit employees who 
worked the thirty minutes a day after the breaks were abolished 
is overly broad because it is applicable to all unit employees, 
some of whom may not have been entitled to or utilized breaks 
-
7This action was effective pursuant to the City's 
memorandum of September 23, 1994. 
-
7The City's memorandum prohibiting all unit employees from 
taking a break during the workday was dated September 22, 1994. 
-
7The time was taken in two, fifteen-minute breaks, one in 
the morning and one in the afternoon, or in one, thirty-minute 
break in the morning. 
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before the ALJ's order and because it is impossible to identify 
the unit employees who stopped taking breaks after the City 
unilaterally abolished them. The City argues that this aspect of 
the order is also punitive because of the City's financial 
condition. 
CSEA supports the ALJ's decision except for one cross-
exception. CSEA argues that the ALJ's order restoring the breaks 
is, by its terms, applicable only to unit employees in certain 
departments in the City. This, CSEA argues, is too restrictive 
since the City's memorandum was directed to all employees and the 
benefit denied was extended unit-wide. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ, with 
modification. 
As to the City's institution of the bi-weekly payroll and 
the one-week lag in pay, the City excepts only to the ALJ's order 
requiring that the weekly payroll be reinstated and that the unit 
employees be "made whole" for any pay which was "lagged", with 
interest at the maximum legal rate. The City argues that because 
of its financial condition the ALJ's order is punitive. 
We are cognizant of the City's current financial 
difficulties.-'' However, as we have previously held, a make-
whole remedy is not rendered inappropriate because compliance may 
-\A municipal assistance corporation for the City has been 
created by the Legislature. See Public Authorities Law, Art. 10, 
§3050 et seq. 
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or will prove financially difficult for the respondent.-' In 
the private sector, as well, the courts have held that there is 
no authority which would exalt the Company's alleged 
precarious financial condition over the employees7 
right to an award of back pay. Manifestly, the 
remedial provisions of the Act should prevail over this 
claim, especially when the Company has enjoyed the 
fruits of its violation.-7 
An order is punitive or remedial by its nature, not by the 
financial condition of the respondent which is subjected to that 
order. A make-whole order is inherently remedial, not punitive. 
Here, the City has retained, for over a year, one week's pay from 
each of these unit employees and it has had the use of those 
funds. That the City may have serious financial concerns does 
not excuse its violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act nor require 
CSEA and the employees it represents to continue to pay for the 
City's violation of law.-7 To insulate the City from the 
standard make-whole order would allow the City to profit from its 
violation of the Act and would encourage other respondents, when 
faced with financial difficulties, to simply disregard their 
-'Town of Newark Valley and Lawrence Kasmarcik, Highway 
Superintendent, 16 PERB 53102 (1983) . 
Z/NLRB v. R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 545 F.2d 187, 93 LRRM 
2609, 2613 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
-
7The City has also lagged the pay of other employees. In a 
recent decision involving the City's police officers, the 
Appellate Division, Third Department rejected the City's claim 
that its "unprecedented financial condition" permitted it to 
avoid its obligations to those employees. The City was 
sanctioned in the amount of $1,000 for "its pursuit of a patently 
meritless appeal." Troy Police Benevolent and Protective Ass'n 
Inc. v. City of Troy, No. 74888 (3d Dep't Jan. 25, 1996). 
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statutory obligations, a result which is entirely inconsistent 
with the purposes and policies of the Act. This same rationale 
applies to the ALJ's order requiring the City to compensate 
certain unit members for the thirty minutes each day they worked 
and were prohibited from taking a break. That order is also 
inherently remedial in nature. 
The City also argues that the ALJ's order constitutes a 
windfall to unit employees because CSEA did not establish either 
that every unit employee used thirty minutes of break time during 
the workday prior to its memorandum prohibiting breaks or that 
every unit member thereafter refrained from taking a 
thirty-minute break during the workday. The ALT found, and the 
record supports the finding, that there was a long-standing 
practice of unit employees having thirty minutes of break time 
each workday and that from the time of the City's prohibition, 
unit employees did not utilize that break time.-7 The City's 
memorandum prohibiting breaks was directed to all employees and 
the City introduced no evidence to establish that the practice 
was not unit-wide or that any unit employee had continued to take 
breaks after the issuance of the City's September 2 2 memorandum. 
The ALJ's order properly rescinds the memorandum and restores to 
unit employees the benefit for which they were eligible before 
-'CSEA's witnesses testified that the practice had been 
ongoing for at least 18 years throughout the unit, including the 
departments of City clerk, mayor, City council, City manager, 
corporation counsel, comptroller, public works, civil service 
commission, treasurer, police department and assessor. 
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the City's unilateral action. There is no windfall to unit 
employees who had not previously received the benefit because 
those who were not entitled to the break time are not made 
eligible for it under the ALJ's order.—7 To the extent that 
the City can establish that there are unit employees who were 
never eligible for the thirty minutes of break time each day or 
who, in disregard of the memorandum, continued to take breaks, 
such evidence may appropriately .be submitted to us in a post-
order compliance proceeding. 
The City also asserts that it is impossible for it to 
ascertain the identity of those employees who previously used the 
thirty minutes of break time and have, since its directive 
abolishing the practice, refrained from taking a break. The 
issue, however, is not whether any particular unit employee 
actually took a break or how often. The guestion is eligibility 
for the break time. If the employee is within the class eligible 
for the benefit, the employee is entitled to the remedy for the 
City's deprivation of that eligibility, whether or not the 
employee previously exercised that right. All unit employees 
were denied any break time by the City's memorandum and all unit 
—''The City, in the brief it filed in support of its 
exceptions, argues that, pursuant to the ALJ's order, unit 
employees will be paid for x»/orking 32»5 hours in a 35—hour work 
week or 35 hours in a 37.5-hour work week. The City's reference 
in its brief to a contractual work week is not evidenced in the 
record, nor has the City argued to us or to the ALJ that it was 
reverting to the contract when it eliminated the breaks. Indeed, 
the record is devoid of any evidence which would support such an 
argument, even if it were properly before us. 
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employees are to be compensated for the time they were required 
to work contrary to practice, subject to the City's proof 
hereafter that certain individuals in the unit were never 
eligible for breaks or that eligible employees took breaks 
notwithstanding the City's prohibition. The mere possibility 
that select individuals in the unit were never eligible for 
breaks or that others on occasion disregarded the prohibition is 
no reason to deny compensation to what is surely the overwhelming 
majority of eligible unit employees who obeyed the City's 
directive.—/ 
In its cross-exception, CSEA argues that the reinstatement 
of break time and compensation for the loss of that time should 
be applicable to all unit employees because the City's memorandum 
prohibiting employees from taking breaks was directed to all unit 
employees and that the record establishes a unit-wide practice. 
The ALJ tailored the order to the departments about which CSEA 
had offered testimony. However, the practice as found and as 
evidenced by the record, is long-standing and widespread 
throughout the unit represented by CSEA. That a department or 
group of employees within the unit who had also been eligible for 
and enjoyed the benefit might not have been specifically 
referenced on the record does not necessitate a finding that they 
are not entitled to restoration of and compensation for the 
^Village of Buchanan, 22 PERB f3001 (1989); City of 
Rochester, 21 PERB J[3040 (1988), conf'd, 155 A.D.2d 1003, 22 PERB 
«[[7035 (4th Dep't 1989) . 
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benefit that was denied by the City's unilateral action. We read 
the ALJ's order as requiring the restoration of the benefit and 
compensation for the loss of that benefit to all unit employees 
who had previously been eligible for the benefit. To the extent 
that the listing of City departments in the ALJ's decision and 
order could be read as limiting the benefit to unit employees 
working in those departments only, the ALJ's decision and order 
is modified to include all unit employees who were prohibited 
from utilizing that break time after the City's September 22, 
1994 memorandum. 
Based on the foregoing, the City's exceptions are denied, 
CSEA's cross-exception is granted, and the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed, as modified. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City immediately: 
1. Rescind the lag and bi-weekly payroll which was 
effectuated pursuant to the City's memorandum of 
September 23, 1994. 
2. Reinstate the weekly payroll. 
3. Make all current and former bargaining unit employees 
whole for any pay which was "lagged", with interest at 
the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
4. Rescind the memorandum dated September 22, 1994, which 
discontinued breaks for all CSEA unit employees. 
5. Restore to all CSEA unit employees the practice of 
allowing a break from work of either fifteen minutes 
each in the morning and fifteen minutes in the 
afternoon, or thirty minutes in the morning. 
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6. Make all CSEA unit employees whole for the thirty-
minutes each day they worked and were prohibited from 
taking a break, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate, from September 22, 1994. 
7. Provide CSEA with the information it requested relating 
to the layoff of unit employees on October 13, 1994. 
8. Restore CSEA representatives' access to City Hall to 
post and distribute notices and information in 
furtherance of its duty to represent unit employees. 
9. Not discriminate against CSEA representatives for 
exercising their right of access to City Hall. 
10. Sign and post the attached notice at all work locations 
ordinarily used to post notices of information to 
employees in the unit represented by CSEA. 
DATED: January 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
fcyl^t L\/\&\U 
Paii l ine R. K i r i s e l l a , Chai rperson 
E r i c Jy. Schmertz, Member/ 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the City of Troy (City) in the unit represented by Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Rensselaer County Local 842, City of Troy Unit (CSEA) that the City will immediately: 
1. Rescind the lag and bi-weekly payroll which was effectuated pursuant to the City's memorandum of September 23,1994. 
2. Reinstate the weekly payroll. 
3. Make all current and former bargaining unit employees whole for any pay which was "lagged", with interest at the 
currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
4. Rescind the memorandum dated September 22,1994, which discontinued breaks for all CSEA unit employees. 
/ 
5. Restore to all CSEA unit employees the practice of allowing a break from work of either fifteen minutes each in the 
morning and fifteen minutes in the afternoon, or thirty minutes in the morning. 
6. Make all CSEA unit employees whole for the thirty minutes each day they worked and were prohibited from taking a 
break, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate, from September 22,1994. 
i 
! 7. Provide CSEA with the information it requested relating to the layoff of unit employees on October 13,1994. 
8. Restore CSEA representatives' access to City Hall to post and distribute notices and information in furtherance of its duty 
to represent unit employees. 
9. Not discriminate against CSEA representatives for exercising their right of access to City Hall. 
Dated By , 
(Representative) (Title) 
CITY OF TROY 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days 
by any other material. 
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
3 * - 1/31/96 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 100 0, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4384 
CITY OP NORWICH, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All senior account clerk/typists, senior 
typists and planner trainees. 
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Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
3B- 1/31/96 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, APSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4455 
TOWN OF CLARENCE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective- negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Senior Clerk, Clerk Typist, Senior Clerk 
Typist, Water District Clerk, Building & Zoning 
Clerk (Assistant Zoning Officer), Building 
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Inspector, Assessment Clerk, 2nd Deputy 
Receiver of Taxes, Animal Control Officer, 
Assistant Animal Control Officer, Computer 
Operator, Real Property Appraiser and Laborer 
(Custodian). 
Excluded: Assessor, Court Clerk, Senior Clerk (Secretary 
to Town Supervisor), Senior Clerk (Secretary to 
Town Board/Town Attorney), Bookkeeper, and all 
other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 31, 199 6 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 100 0, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4457 
MASSENA HOUSING AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Building Maintenance Worker, Youth Activities 
Coordinator, Youth Activities Aide, Tenant 
Relations Assistant, Keyboard Specialist (FT), 
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Keyboard Specialist (PT), Modernization 
Coordinator, and Cleaner 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
n l i n p P . ' T f n n c f i l 1 a _ Pauline R. 'Kinsella, Chairperson 
/^Ct^^CCA^ j^dA. 
Eric / . Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW PALTZ POLICE ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE-NO. C-4413 
TOWN OF NEW PALTZ, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW PALTZ POLICE DEPARTMENT LOCAL, 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New Paltz Police Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
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settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All part-time and full-time Dispatchers and 
Senior Dispatchers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the New Paltz Police 
Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
f*Jz& kw4 
& Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric J. Schmertz, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JEFFERSON-LEWIS-HAMILTON-HERKIMER-
ONEIDA BOCES PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-43 64 
JEFFERSON-LEWIS-HAMILTON-HERKIMER-
ONEIDA BOCES, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Jefferson-Lewis-Hamilton-
Herkimer-Oneida BOCES Professional Association has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All professional teaching employees, and Adult 
Education Specialist, COTA, CPTA, Nurse, School 
Social Worker, Occupational Therapist, and 
Physical Therapist. 
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Excluded: Superintendent, Assistant Superintendents, 
Directors, Assistant Directors, Coordinators, 
Coordinator Assistants, Supervisors who spend 
more than fifty percent of their time in an 
administrative capacity, Career Education 
Counselor, Project Charlie Specialist, and 
Placement Specialist. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Jefferson-Lewis-Hamilton-
Herkimer-Oneida BOCES Professional Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-442 8 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 833, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the units agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit A White Collar (Administrative) Unit; 
Included: See attachment A. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Unit B Blue Collar (Operational) Unit: 
Included: See attachment B. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: January 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
me R. Kinsella, Cnai rperson 
ic J. Schmertz, Member 
ATTACHMENT A 
White Collar (Administrative) Unit 
Account Clerk • • 
Account Clerk Typist 
Accounting Supervisor 
Accounting Supervisor Grade B 
••Administrative Asst 
Administrative Officer 
Alcoholism Counselor Trainee 
Alcoholism Counselor I 
Alcoholism Counselor II 
Alcoholism Counselor III 
Assoc Employment L Training Coord 
Assoc Planner 
Assoc Graphic Artist 
Assistant Building Superintendent (MVCC) 
A39t Motor Vehicle Bureau Supervisor 
Auditor 
Auditor i 
Auditor 3 
Automotive Mechanic (MVCC) 
Activity Therapist 
Building Maintenance Helper (MVCC) 
Building Maintenance Mechanic (MVCC) 
Building Maintenance Worker (MYCC) 
Building Maintenance Supervisor (MVCC) 
Building Superintendent (MVCC) 
Buyer 
Campus Security Officer (MVCC) 
CAP Coordinator 
CAP Nurse 
CAP Social Worker 
Case Supervisor Grade A 
Case Supervisor Grade B 
Caseworker 
Cashier 
Chief Social Welfare Examiner 
Child L Family Specialist 
Clerk 
Clerk Typist 
Central Stores Clerk 
Community Service Aide 
Community Service Worker 
Community Service Worker (Spanish Speaking) 
Computer Programming Technician 
Computer Operator 
* Confidential Investigator 
• Confidential Support Investigator 
• Contract Administrator 
Crisis Intervention Counselor 
Customer Relations Supervisor 
Data Entry Machine Operator 
* Director of Data Processing Services 
Director of Records Management 
Disbursements Officer 
White Collar (Administrative) Unit 
Printing Supervisor 
Probation Aaat 
Probation Officer 
Probation Supervisor 
Program Analyst 
Psychology Intern 
Public Health Engineer 
Public Health Sanitarian 
Public Health Technician 
Purchasing Agent 1HVCC) 
Research Specialist _. 
Real Property Tax Service Coord. 
Resource Investigator 
Social Service Investigator 
Secretary to Real Property Tax Service 
Social Welfare Examiner 
Social Work Asst 
Sr Account Clerk 
Sr Account Clerk Typist 
Sr Administrative Asst 
Sr Audit Clerk 
Sr Building Maintenance Mechanic (PIYCC) 
Sr Buyer 
Sr Caseworker 
Sr Clerk 
Sr Computer Operator 
Sr Confidential Investigator 
Sr Data Entry Machine Operator 
Sr Draftsman 
Sr E8.T Coord 
Sr E&T Counselor 
Sr Nutrition Outreach Worker 
Sr Payroll Clerk 
Sr Planner 
Sr Probation Officer 
Sr Public Health Sani tar ian 
Sr Social Welfare Examiner 
Sr Stenographer 
Sr Support Collector 
Sr Support Invest igator 
Sr Tax Map Technician 
Sr Typist 
Stenographer 
Stop-DWI Program Administrator 
Storekeeper <HYCC) 
Substance Abuse Counselor Trainee 
Substance Abuse Counselor I 
Substance Abuse Counselor II 
Substance Abuse Counselor III 
Support Investigator 
Supervisor of Building Service (MVCC) 
Supervising Campus Security Officer <MYCC) 
Supervising CAP Nurse 
Blue C o l l a r ( O p e r a t i o n a l ) Un i t 
Mason 
Medical Transcriber 
Nursing Asst 
Occupational Therapy Asst 
Painter 
Physical Therapy Aide 
Recreation Therapist 
Residential Activity Facilitator 
Sever Maintenance Equipment Operator 
Sewer Maintenance Foreman 
Sign Maintenance Worker 
Sr Building Maintenance Helper 
Sr Custodian 
Sr Lab Tech (Water Pollution Control) 
Sr Water Pollution Control Operator 
Store Keeper 
Sewage Treatment Plant Attendant 
Sewage Treatment Plant Electrician 
Sewage Treatment Plant Maintenance Helper 
Sewage Treatment Plant Maintenance Supervisor 
Sewage Treatment Plant Maintenance Worker 
Substance Abuse Aide • 
Superintendent Airport Maintenance 
Supervising Building Maintenance Helper 
Supervising Residential Activity Facilitator 
Telephone Operator 
Ward Clerk 
Water Resource Chemist 
Working Foreman 
Water Pollution Control Operator 
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5A- 1/31/96 
PROPOSED RULES 
(deletions are in brackets; additions are underlined) 
Amend section 201.2(b) to read as follows: 
[Notwithstanding section 201.4 of this Part, a] A petition may be filed at 
any time by a public employer or a recognized or certified employee 
organization to clarify whether a [new or substantially altered] position 
is encompassed within the scope of an existing unit, (hereafter called a 
unit clarification petition) , or to determine the unit placement of a [new 
or substantially altered] position (hereafter called a unit placement 
petition) . [A unit clarification petition may be filed either upon the 
consent of the parties or upon a showing that petitioner could not have 
filed a timely petition pursuant to section 201.3 of this Part. A unit 
placement petition may only be filed upon a showing that petitioner could 
not have filed a timely petition pursuant to section 201.3 of this Part.] 
The filing and processing of the petition shall be in accordance with 
sections 201.5(c), 201.5rd), 201.7(a) and (d), 201.8, 201.9(a)-(f) and 
201.11 of this Part. Section 201.4 of this Part shall not apply. In 
determining the unit placement of [any new or substantially altered] a 
position, the director shall consider whether the placement would be 
consistent with the criteria set forth in section 207 of the act. The 
director may decline to make any clarification or placement not otherwise 
consistent with the purposes or policies of the act. Exceptions to any 
determination of the director may be filed pursuant to section 201.12 of 
this Part. 
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K*J Amend section 201.3(a) to read as follows: 
A petition for certification may be filed between 30 and [60] 120 days 
after a public employer has been asked to recognize an employee 
organization, if the request has not been denied and no employee 
organization has been recognized or certified as majority representative of 
any of the employees within the unit alleged to be appropriate; provided, 
however, that the petition may be filed by the public employer within such 
3 0 days. Unless filed by a public employer, such a petition shall be 
supported by a showing of interest of at least 30 percent of the employees 
within the unit alleged to be appropriate. 
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Amend section 201.4(b) to read as follows: 
(b) In determining whether the evidence submitted to establish a showing 
of interest is timely, the director will accept evidence of dues deduction 
authorizations which have not been revoked, evidence of current membership, 
original designation cards or petitions which were signed and dated within 
six months of the submission, or a combination of the three. Designation 
cards shall be submitted in alphabetical order. 
That part of any showing of interest consisting of signed and dated 
employee petitions submitted on or after January 1, 1996 shall be submitted 
on a form prescribed by the director, which shall include the name of the 
petitioner, the unit alleged by the petitioner to be appropriate, and shall 
represent that the showing of interest is in support of the certification 
and/or decertification petition as applicable. 
The director may require that an alphabetized listing of the names of the 
signatories on individually signed and dated petitions be filed within a 
reasonable period of time after submission of the showing of interest 
petitions. If such an alphabetized listing is required, the person or 
persons filing the listing shall simultaneously file with the director a 
signed attestation that the listing sets forth only the names of the 
signatories on the showing of interest petitions. 
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Amend section 201.4(d) to read as follows: 
A declaration of authenticity, signed and sworn to before any person 
authorized to administer oaths, shall be filed by the petitioner or movant 
with the director simultaneously with the filing of the showing of interest 
or any evidence of majority status for the purpose of certification without 
an election, pursuant to section 201.9(g)(1) of this Part. Such 
declaration of authenticity shall contain the following: 
(1) the name of the individual executing the declaration, and a statement 
of the declarant's authority to execute it; if on behalf of an employee 
organization, the declarant's position with the employee organization, and 
a statement of the declarant's authority to execute the declaration on its 
behalf; and 
(2) a declaration that, upon the declarant's personal knowledge, or 
inquiries that the declarant has made, the persons whose names appear upon 
the evidence submitted have themselves' signed such evidence[s] on the dates 
specified thereon, [and] the persons specified as current members are in 
fact current members [. ] , and that inquiry was made of all signatories to 
the evidence submitted regarding their inclusion in any existing 
negotiating unit which is the subject of the representation petition. If 
the declaration is upon inquiries the declarant has made, and not upon the 
declarant's personal knowledge, the declarant shall specify the nature of 
those inquiries. 
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Add a new section 201.5(e) to read as follows: 
Notice of filing of application. In any case in which the director 
determines that notice in accordance with this section may be reasonably 
given by a party filing a petition for certification or a petition under 
section 201.2(b) of this Part, which seeks a review of a managerial or 
confidential designation made pursuant to section 2 01.10 of this Part, that 
party shall mail notice thereof in conformity with the director7 s 
determination to each managerial or confidential designee named in the 
petition and state in writing to the director that it has mailed the notice 
of filing in accordance with this section. The notice shall include the 
date the petitioner filed the petition with the director and a copy of the 
petition and such attachments thereto as pertain to the named designee. 
\ 
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Amend section 201.9(a)(1) to read as follows: 
Investigation. Subsequent to the filing of a petition, the director shall 
direct an investigation of all questions concerning representation, 
including, if applicable, whether the showing of interest requirement, as 
set forth in sections 201.3 and 201.4 of this Part, has been met; whether 
more than one employee organization seeks to represent some or all of the 
employees in the allegedly appropriate unit; and whether there is agreement 
among the parties as to the appropriateness of the alleged unit[;]j_ [and 
whether the parties wish the negotiating representative to have exclusive 
rights of representation.] 
-7-
Amend section 201.9(g) to read as follows: 
Action by director. After completion of the investigation or hearing, as 
the case may be, or upon the consent of the parties, the director shall 
[issue a decision which may direct an election or otherwise] dispose of 
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Amend section 201.9(g)(1) to read as follows: 
Certification without an election. If the choice available to the 
employees in a negotiating unit is limited to the selection or rejection of 
a single employee organization, that choice may be ascertained by the 
director on the basis of dues deduction authorizations and other 
evidence[s] instead of by an election. In such a case, the employee 
organization involved will be certified without an election if a majority 
of the employees within the unit have indicated their choice by the 
execution of dues deduction authorization cards which are current, or by 
individual designation cards which have been executed within six months 
prior to the date of the director's decision recommending certification 
without an election. The determination by the director that the 
indications of employee support are not sufficient for certification 
without an election is a ministerial act and will not be reviewed by the 
board. The director shall inform all parties in writing if the director 
determines that the indications of employee support are sufficient for 
certification without an election. The director's determination in this 
respect is reviewable by the board pursuant to a written objection to 
certification filed with the board by a party within five working davs 
after its receipt of the director's notification. An objection to 
certification shall set forth all grounds for the objection with supporting 
facts and shall be served on all parties to the proceeding. A response to 
the objection may be filed within five working davs after a party's receipt 
of the objection. A copy of any response shall be served on all other 
parties. Section 201.12 of this Part shall not otherwise apply except 
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paraaraphs (b^  (1). fd) and (i) thereof. 
Amend section 201.9(h)(2) to read as follows: 
[Within five working days after a final tally of ballots has been 
furnished, any] Any party may file with the director an original and four 
copies of objections to the conduct of the election or conduct affecting 
the results of the election[.] within five working days after its receipt 
of a final tally of ballots. Such objections shall contain a [short 
statement of the reasons therefor.] clear and concise statement of the 
facts constituting the bases for the obiection, including the names of the 
individuals involved and the time and place of occurrence of each 
particular act alleged. The objections shall be in writing and be signed 
and sworn to before any person authorized to administer oaths. Copies of 
such objections shall simultaneously be served upon each of the other 
parties by the party filing them, and proof of service shall be filed with 
the director. 
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 Amend section 201.9(h)(3) to read as follows: 
An answer [may] shall be filed within five working days [from service] 
after receipt of the objections. One copy of the answer shall be served on 
each party and the original, with proof of service and four copies, shall 
be filed with the director. The answer[, if submitted,] shall contain a 
[concise statement of facts in refutation of the objections.] specific 
admission, denial or explanation of each allegation of the obnection and a 
clear and concise statement of any other relevant facts. The original 
shall be signed and sworn to before any person authorized to administer 
oaths. 
If a party fails or refuses to file a required answer, such failure or 
refusal mav be deemed to constitute that party's admission of the material 
i ' . 
facts in the objections and a waiver by that party of a hearing. 
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Amend section 201.9(h)(4) to read as follows: 
If objections are filed to the conduct of the election or conduct 
affecting the results of the election, or if challenged ballots are 
sufficient in number to affect the results of the election, the director 
shall investigate such objections or challenges, or both, and shall 
[prepare a decision.] take the appropriate action which may include the 
direction of a hearing in accordance with the provisions of section 
201.9(b)-(e) of this Part and the issuance of a decision. 
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Amend section 201.10(b) to read as follows: 
Time for filing of applications. An application may be filed [from the 
first day of the fourth month through the last day of the fifth month of 
the fiscal year of the public employer;] at any timer provided, however, 
that with respect to any persons who are in a unit for which an employee 
organization has been recognized or certified, only one application which 
has been processed to completion may be filed during a period of 
unchallenged representation status. 
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Amend section 201.11 to read as follows: 
Upon completion of proceedings, the director shall issue a decision 
and submit the record of the case to the board. The record shall include 
the petition or application, notice of hearing, motions, rulings, orders, 
stenographic report of the hearing, stipulations, exceptions, documentary 
evidence, any briefs or other documents submitted by the parties, 
objections to the conduct of an election or conduct affecting the results 
of an election, and the decision of the director. Briefs may be filed 
within such time and upon such terms as the director or the assigned 
administrative law judge may direct. Reply or supplemental briefs, however 
denominated, will not be permitted without prior reguest to and approval by 
the director or the assigned administrative law judge. Such requests will 
not be approved unless the opponent's brief properly raises issues for the 
first time which are material to the disposition of the matter. 
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Amend section 204.8 to read as follows: 
Any party shall be entitled upon request made before the close of a hearing 
conducted by an administrative law judge designated by the director, to 
file an original and four copies of a brief or proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, or both, within such time as fixed by the 
administrative law judge. The administrative law judge may direct the 
filing of briefs when the submission of briefs is warranted by the nature 
of the proceeding or the particular issue therein. Any such brief or 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law filed with the 
administrative law judge must be accompanied by proof of service of a copy 
thereof upon all other parties. Reply or supplemental briefs, however 
denominated, will not be permitted without prior request to and approval bv 
the administrative law judge. Such requests will not be approved unless 
the opponent's brief properly raises issues for the first time which are 
material to the disposition of the matter. 
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Amend section 206.7(a) to read as follows: 
After completion of the hearing, or upon the consent of the parties, 
the administrative law judge, if any, shall submit the case, including his 
or her report and recommendations, to the board. The record shall include 
the charge, notice of hearing, motions, rulings, orders, stenographic 
report of the hearing, stipulations, exceptions, documentary evidence and 
any brief or other documents submitted by the parties. The board shall 
cause the report and recommendations of the administrative law judge, if 
any, to be delivered to all parties to the proceeding. Briefs may be filed 
by any party within seven working days after receipt of the report and 
recommendations of the administrative law judge, if any; provided, however, 
that the board may extend the time during which briefs may be filed because 
of extraordinary circumstances. An original and four copies of the briefs 
shall be filed with the board. Reply or supplemental briefs, however 
denominated, will not be permitted without prior request to and approval by 
the board. Such requests will not be approved unless the opponent7s brief 
properly raises issues for the first time which are material to the 
disposition of the matter. 
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Add a new Part 211 Subpoenas 
Section 211.1 Scope. fa) This Part applies to the agency's issuance of 
subpoenas to compel the attendance of a person to testify at a hearing 
conducted by the board or a designee of the board on behalf of a party who 
is not represented by an attorney of record, subpoenas reguiring the 
production of books, papers, documents or other objects from a municipal 
corporation or the state, and subpoenas reguiring the production of booksr 
papers, documents or other objects on behalf of a party who is not 
represented by an attorney of record. 
(b) Nothing contained herein shall in any way affect the right of any 
person or entity to issue a subpoena pursuant to law. 
Section 211.2 Issuance of subpoenas. All agency subpoenas shall be issued 
by and at the discretion of the presiding administrative law judge or other 
presiding officer or agent of the board (hereafter referred to as the ALJ1. 
The ALJ may grant or deny any subpoena request in whole or in part. 
Requests for a subpoena made within ten working days of a scheduled hearing 
will not be considered absent good cause shown by the party requesting the 
subpoena. 
Section 211.3 Reguest for subpoena. fa) The ALJ may issue a subpoena only 
when the party applying for it submits a written affidavit conforming to 
the requirements of this Part. 
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(h) Contents of affidavit for a witness subpoena. Such affidavit must 
specify: (1) the name and address of each individual for whom the subpoena 
is sought: and (2) facts sufficient to establish the relevancy of the 
testimony to be adduced pursuant to the subpoena. 
fc) Contents of affidavit for subpoena requiring the production of books, 
papers, documents or other objects; response. Such affidavit must specify: 
(1) the books, papers, documents or other objects to be produced pursuant 
to the subpoena; (2) facts sufficient to establish the relevancy of the 
materials to be produced; and (3) that a copy of the subpoena request and 
affidavit has been served upon all other parties. A party may file with 
the ALT a response to the subpoena request, with copy to all other parties, 
within five working days after its receipt of the subpoena request. 
Section 211.4 Service of subpoena. (a) The ALJ shall notify all parties 
as to the disposition of any subpoena request and shall furnish the party 
requesting the subpoena a completed subpoena form if the request has been 
granted in any respect. 
(h) Service of the subpoena and the payment of appropriate witness fees 
shall be the responsibility of the requesting party and shall be made as 
required by law. 
-18-
Section 211.5 Time and place for production of documents. Any booksr 
papers, documents or other objects ordered pursuant to this Part shall be 
produced at the date and time specified in the notice of hearing and/or at 
any adjourned dates as directed by the ALJ unless production of the 
subpoenaed material at a reasonable time before the scheduled hearing date 
is necessary in the judgment of the ALT to avoid unreasonable delay in the 
commencement of the hearing due to the volume and/or the complexity of the 
material to be produced. 
Section 211.6 Motion to withdraw or modify. (a) Any individual who has 
been served with a subpoena or any party may file a motion with the ALJ on 
notice to all parties, to withdraw or modify any subpoena issued pursuant 
to this Part. 
(b) Any such motion must be made as soon as reasonably possible after the 
issuance of the subpoena so as not to interfere with the processing of the 
case. 
(c) The ALJ upon motion by a party or sua sponte may withdraw or modify a 
subpoena issued pursuant to this Part for good cause. 
(&) Nothing in this section shall in any way affect any rights of any 
person or entity under law. 
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Section 211.7 Failure to honor a subpoena. (a.) If a party or witness 
fails without reasonable excuse to comply with a subpoena properly served, 
the default shall be noted in the record. (i>) The A U mav. in his or her 
discretion, adjourn all or part of the hearing to allow the party who has 
requested the subpoena a reasonable opportunity to obtain compliance with 
the subpoena in accordance with applicable law. The ALJ may also strike 
from the record the pleadings and/or any testimony offered at the hearing 
by or on behalf of the person or party which has not complied with the 
subpoena or is responsible for the noncompliance, may strike those portions 
of the testimony which are related to the matter called for in the 
subpoena, or may take such other action as is appropriate. 
